En: Control and accountability of private security companies In Europe
The degree of control and accountability of PSCs depends on a clear legal framework, effective oversight institutions and the type of oversight exercised by those institutions.
Control and accountability is weakened or rendered ineffective if it is not based on a clear and uniform regulatory framework. In this context, specific PSC laws are lacking in Cyprus; Malta has a legal framework governing the industry, but the specific regulation of control and accountability has been omitted from its laws. In other states, PSC regulation is a matter of devolved government leading to different pieces of legislation in different parts of the country, as is the case in Switzerland and Italy. In some countries, e.g., Germany and Austria, the regulatory framework is based on general commercial laws instead of specific PSC laws. One might question the extent to which these commercial legal frameworks are fully applicable to the private security sector, which has its own dynamics and specific concerns related to maintaining law and order and upholding human rights. A last group consists of states which have adopted specific private security laws, such as France, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands.
In different EU states, a great variety of oversight institutions exercise oversight of PSCs. In some states, PSCs come under the control of (local) police (e.g., in Greece, Denmark, Slovakia and Hungary); in other states, local civil authorities are responsible for controlling the sector (e.g., Germany, Italy and Sweden); the ministry of the interior controls the PSC sector in Slovenia, Italy, Poland and the Netherlands; the ministry of justice is responsible for oversight in Luxembourg; and, in Ireland and the U.K., a special security authority was established to oversee the PSC sector. As mentioned previously, in the event that the PSC is a competitor of the police, a conflict of interest may arise when the police is tasked with the oversight of the PSC sector.
Another issue is how oversight is exercised. Is the oversight limited to 'paper' control only, i.e., requesting that the PSCs submit yearly reports? Or does oversight include inspection visits, both announced and unannounced? Another option is that oversight is complaint-based, in case citizens or companies file complaints against illegally operating PSCs. In this latter context, it is curious that the EU-wide research into PSCs carried out by CoESS does not take into account the role of parliamentary inquiry committees and the ombudsman, who essentially have far-reaching powers to conduct independent research into complaints and scandals. A last aspect of control is the availability of sanctions if wrongdoing is detected. Across EU member States different sanction regimes are in place, varying from fines, temporary or permanent withdrawal of licences to imprisonment.
In most South East European countries, the ministry of the interior exercises oversight over PSC activities. The ministry of the interiors' oversight in these countries is, however, mostly weak or unclear. In Albania, the police itself is tasked with the oversight of PSCs. In all SEE countries, parliamentary powers to oversee this area are not exercised and the functioning of the ombudsman is either unclear or weak. Self regulation in terms of PSC codes of conduct do not exist in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Moldova. In other countries, only some PSCs possess a code of conduct, while other PSCs have a secret code of conduct, unknown to the public.
The lack of a coherent national regulatory framework hampers oversight in various SEE states. No specific legislation exists in Serbia. In BiH, no national (federal) legislation exists, with legislation only on the entities-level, leading to differences between the entities and, unfortunately, contributing to PSCs developing along ethnic lines. In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), concerns exist about the inadequate enforcement of the law, while in Moldova, the legal framework is excessively complex and sanctions are not sufficient to deter illegal PSC behaviour. In Romania, the law is open to misinterpretation and the police does not have sufficient power to close down illegal or poorly performing PSCs. Kosovo presents an interesting case as the regulatory framework is mainly based on regulations of the international community (UNMIK) as opposed to nationally enacted laws.
In Russia, control over PSCs is exercised by the ministry of the interior and the prosecutor general's office.In Ukraine, the ministry of the interior is responsible for regulating the private security sector, including issuing or withdrawing licenses. In this sense, the double role of the ministry of the interior as sector regulator and as private service provider is highly problematic. In Georgia, the private security sector is weakly governed, primarily because of the lack of specific PSC legislation. There is virtually no possibility of ensuring that standards are maintained throughout the sector in Georgia. PSCs involved in protecting the oil pipeline project (undertaken by a British Petroleum led consortium) in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, are currently subjected to human rights and security monitoring assessments. It is a form of self-assessment carried out by a third party, commissioned by the oil industry as a client of the PSC. This third- party assesses whether public and private security firms involved in protecting oil assets are committed to the 'voluntary principles of human rights and security.
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